Female labour supply in farm households: Farm and off-farm participation by Callan, T. & Soest, A.H.O. van
~„M ~ï~ c DISCUSSlOri
for a er 8414 ~mic Research 1993
10
i~~~u~ipiiuiiiii~piHi~imii~'~iNo. 9310
FEMALE LABOUR SUPPLY IN FARM HOUSEHOLDS:
FARM AND OFF-FARM PARTICIPATION
by Tim Callan
and Arthur van Soest
February 1993Female Labour Supply in Farm Households:
Farm and Oft-Farm Participation
Tim Callan and Arthur van Soest
(ESRI and Tilburg University)
Abstract
In Ireland, with its relatively large farm sector, the numbers of farmer's wives who
exercise the option of becoming "relastives assisting" is substantial. Using cross-
section household data collected by ESRI in 1987, we analyse various models in
which farmer's wives choose between farm work, off-farm paid work, and other
(home production) activities. The explanatory variables include family characteris-
tics, farm characteristics, and the wife's wage rate for off-fam work. We compare
probit and logit type of models, and allow for wage rate endogeneity. The main
finding according to all models is the very large sensitivity of off-farm participation
with respect to the wage.
We are indebted to Gerry Boyle, participants in the SPES Workshop on Microeco-
nometrics of European Iabour Markets, and a CentER referee for helpful comments and
suggestions. Financial support from the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences
(KNAW) is gratefully acknowledged by the second author.-1-
1. Introduction
A vast literature on the analysis of female labour supply has grown up in recent decades.
But most studies in this literature exclude women whose husbands are self-employed or
fatmers.' Thc main rcason lor this exclusion is that such women may face different ec;onomic
opportunities from others. They have an additional option of assisting on the family farm or
business. Furthermore, the value of their time in this use is not conveniently summarised by
a wage: by definition, relatives assisting are family members who do not receive a regulaz
wage. This creates obvious difficulties in modelling the incentives facing them.
In many countries, the proportion of married women who have this addiáonal opáon is
low: their exclusion from studies in the UK or USA, for example, dces not greatly affect the
overall picture of married women's labour supply in those countries. But in Ireland the size
of the self-employed sector, and more especially of the farm sector, is such that the issue is
potenáally important. Adjustment of fatm labour supply to changes in the balance betwcen
farm and off-farm opportunities is of considerable relevance in the context of reforms of the
Common Agricultural Policy and the reductions in agricultural output likely to be associated
with the completion of the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations. It is clear from the general
labour supply literature that women's labour supply may be more responsive than that of inen,
so that particular attention may need to be given to the labour supply of farm wives in this
context.
This palxr has threc m;tin aims.
(1) To establish the extent to which married women in lrish fatm
households exercise the option of becoming "relatives assisting"
in farm work.
1 See, for example, Killingsworth and Heckman's (1986) summary of the samples used in
these various studies: the vast majority exclude women who are themselves self-employed,
or whose husband is self-employed or a farmer.-2-
(2) To identify and analyse factors influencing fatm wives'
allocation of time between farm work, off-farm paid work, and
other acáviàes.
(3) To explore the sensitivity of esàmates of farm wives' labour
supply elasàciries with respect to model specificaàons and
esàmaàon procedures.
The paper is structured as follows. Secàon 2 deals with the first of these objecàves, and
outlines the nature of the data gathered in the ESRI Survey of Income Distribuàon, Poverty
and Usage of State Services. A model of the decision between participation in farm work,
off-fann employment and non-participaàon is outlined in secáon 3, together with the
esámaáon procedures. Secàon 4 deals with the results, and considers the sensitivity of wage
elasàciáes with respect to choices made in model specification and estimaáon.
2. Relatives assisting: a dying breed or a hidden army?
Esámates of the incidence of relatives assisàng on family farms vary widely, as pointed
out by Fahey (1990). Table 1 draws together inforrnation frtim the Census of Population, the
Labour Force Survey, the EC Farm Structures Survey, and the ESRI Survey of Income
Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services. The Census of Population and Labour
Fonce Survey results suggest that the numbers engaged as relaàves assisting have declined to
very low levels. The Census of Populaàon uses a "principal economic status" classification
(PES). As Fahey points out, "PES data tend to discount the economic activiry of women who
see their primary role in tetms of housework" (Fahey, 1990, p. 179). It is not surprising,
therefore, that the Census figures show vcry low numbers classified as rclatives assisting.-3-
Table 1: Altenwtive Estimates ofNumbers of "Relatives Assisting"
Data source
Total Agriculture
Year Male Fema[e Male Female
Census of Population 1971 50,800 8,100 - -
Census of Population 1981 23,300 5,400 - -
Labour Fon.e Survey 1987 15,800 8,700 13,900 5,000
EC Farm Structures Survey 1979-80 - - - 94,300
(married women at work in
farming)
ESRI Survey 1987 - - - 38,300
(married women at work in
farming as a.ssisting relatives)
The Labour Force Survey uses both a PES definiáon and an alternative definiáon (a
labour force measure), under which persons who aze engaged in activity for "pay, profit or
family gain" for more than one hour per week are classified as economically acáve. The
figures in Table 1 show that the numbers under the altetnaáve definition in the 1987 Labour
Force Survey aze of the same order of magnitude as those for the PES definiáon in the 1981
Census of Population. On the basis of a closer comparison of the definiáons within the 1983
Labour Force Survey, Fahey (1990) concludes that the numbers on a labour force definiáon
are somewhat higher than those on a PF.S definition, but that the differences within agriculture
are surprisingly small.
Sectoral studies ofagriculture have shown quite different results. The ECFarm Structttre
survey2 of 1979-80, found over 10 times as many women at work in agriculttue as the 1981
Census; and almost 30 times as many married women at work in agriculture. Short-term and
seasonal participation were included in this meastue, but accounted foronly a small proportion
2 For a more detailed assessment of this data source see Fahey (1990) and O'Neill (1985).-4-
of the total. The level of participaáon shown by this data source has fluctuated, giving rise to
suspicions of ineasurement error, but these fluctuaáons have been at a high level relaáve to the
Census and Labour Force Surveys.
Fahey's conclusion, based on comparisons within and between these surveys, and
addiáonal evidence from the study by Hannan and Katsioaouni (1977)', is that the Labour
Force Survey (and afortiori the Census of Populaáon) underesámates the numbers of farm
wivesengaged in farm work, while the figures in the Fazm Structures Survey may be somewhat
on the high side. Differences in concepts may play some role in creaáng the gap betwcen the
different esámates, but it is cleaz that there are also substantial biases involved. The reasons
for such biases are outside the scope of the present paper; suffice it to say that difficulties in
establishing the boundaries betwcen fatm work and other work, the preconceprions of
enumerators, interviewers and respondenu, shaped by general societal atátudes and the
relaáve preságe accot~ded to different statuses have all bcen identified as possible
COntributors."
The ESRI Survey of Income Distribuáon, Poverty and Usage of State Services,
conducted in 1987, offers some new perspecáves on this issue. Respondents answered
qucsáons about the'u main economic status in a way similaz to that for the Labour Force
Survey. But they were also asked separate quesáons about extent of fann work, irrospecáve
of their answer to the quesáon on principal economic status.s Those who stated that their
principal status was home duties, but reported working more than an hour a week on the farm
3 This additional evidence includes the fact that two-thi~s of the farm husbands interviewed
by Hannan and Katsioaouni s[ated that without the contribution of wives and younger
children, some line of pmduction would have to be dropped.
4 Shortall (1990), for example, argues that the concentraáon on traditionally defined farm
work obscures women's role.
5 The key quesáon, asked of every respondent, was "Do you own or operate any fatm land,
or assist with the running of a fatm owned by a member of your family?". Follow up
quesáons included the number of weeks of full-áme work, and for part-time work, the
number of weeks and weekly hours.-5-
were reclassified to the status of reladves assisting.b This definiáon of "relatives assisáng" in
the t?SRI survcy prcxluces a figurc which is hetween that of the Farm Stnicture survey, which
is suspected of being an over-estimate, and those ofthe Census of Population and Labour Force
Surveys, which are suspected of t~eing underestimates. It is this ESRI data which provides the
basis for the analysis of fann wives choice of farm as against off-farm participation in the next
section.
Table 2 shows how the sample used in the econometric analysis was arrived at. A total
of 51 I farm households contained a married woman, but only 418 of these were aged under
65 and married to the person mainly responsible for the fatm. Missing data led tothe exclusion
of a further 23 cases, leaving a sample of 395 cases for analysis.
Table 2: Definition ofSample ofFarm Wives
Inclusion criterion N excluded N remaining
Total number of fat~tt households 0 670
Married woman in farm household 159 511
Married woman is aged under 65 55 456
Husband is person mainly responsible for farm 38 418
Full individual questionnaire for woman 23 395
Source: ESRI Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty andUsage of State Services, 1987.
Of the 395 remaining cases, 44 women (1 l.l per cent) were engaged in paid off-farm
employment, 159 (40.3 per cent) were classified as relatives assisting with farm work, with the
remaining 192 (48.6 per cent) engaged in neither of these activities. A descápáon of the
variables used in the analysis is given in Appendix A, with sample staástics in Appendix B.
More detailed information on weeks and hours of work is available for about 85 per cent
of those classified as relatives assisting. Of these, about 80 percent were found to have worked
for 40 weeks or more in the year; and less than 8 per cent worked fewer than 13 weeks.
6 Most ofthose reclassified in this way worked substantially more than the minimum hours.-6-
Combining information on weeks worked and hours worked per week, we constructed a
measure ofannual labour input. Taking a value of 48 weeks at 40 hours as a measure of a full
year's work, we found that 11 per cent worked as relatives assisring for a full yeaz, 26 per cent
worked between a half-year and a full year, and a further 38 per cent worked the equivalent of
between a quarter-yeaz and a half-yeaz. Thus, for the vast majority of those classified as
relatives assisting, their role involved a substantial time commitment rather than simply a
seasonal one.'
Ofthe 44 women working in paid employment, only 1 worked for less than 20 hours per
week, and over 70 per cent worked for at least 30 hours per week. This suggests that either
the opportunities for part-time work were extremely limited, or the fixed costs associated with
employment (such as travel to work, and some element of childcare costs) discouraged the
choice of such atrangements.
7 Interviews were conducted between February and September 1987. Some women who
had only a short, seasonal involvement in farm work may not have classified themselves as
relatives assisting because ofthe timing of the interview; but the group identified here, as
indicated by the extra information on weeks of work, does not include many such women.-~-
3. Analysis of female labour supply in farm households
3.1 Models
B~tsi~ .tif~~dc!
Our foc:us in this section is on the labour supply behaviour of fat~n wives. As noted
eazlier, the labour supply of this group is rendered more complex by the fact that they may
allocate time to fartn activities, as well as to off-farm employment, home production and
leisure. The data collected in the ESRI survey are not sufficiendy detailed to support a full
structural model along the lines of the household production models surveyed by Gronau
(1986). A structural model would include a production function (in this case, for fazm output),
with the time spent by a farm wife as relative assisting figuring as one form of labour input,
substitutable against other labour and non-labour inputs. Here a simpler approach is adopted,
with famt characteristics (farm size, soil type and farm system) being treated as factors which
shift the productiviry of labour inputs. These factors are treated as exogenous, as well as the
off-fatm labour supply ofthe husband. Themain endogenous variable is an index D indicating
the woman's type of economic activity:
D-1: the woman has a fortrtal job and receives a wage (employed)
D-2: the woman works on the farm (relative assisting)
D~: the woman is neither an employee, nor a relative assisting (non-participant)
The value of D indicates the main activity. In principle, it is possible that individuals might
combine famt work and off-farm employment. But the data show that very few women
combine farm work and off-farm work, so that D can be treated as having one and only one
value. A wage rate is observed if and only if D-1. The natttral logarithm of the wife's gross
(i.e., pre-tax) hourly wage rate is denoted by W.
We want to find out what detetmines D, with emphasis on economic factors such as W.
W is treated separately from the other variables, because of the observability problem (it is not-8-
observed unless D-1) and because of possible endogeneity. We therefore also include a wage
equaàon. A so-called "random uàlity" model can captttre the main features of interest. The
complete model for individual i is as follows:
Uy -Ay t uV (j - 0,1,2) (1)
D; - j if and only if UV 2 U;,, k- 0,1,2 (2)
Ay-X,~a;}y;k; U-1,2); A;~-O (3)
W; - Z;'at v; (4)
ua-fl; (u~~~u~~v~IX;,Z;~-IV3(fl,E) (5)
Thus, ify, -yZ - 0, (1) through (3) yield the familiar multinomial probit model with three
alternaàves (see, for example, Maddala, 1983). By means of notmalisaàon, E(1,1)-E(2,2)-1.
Because only the differences Uy -U~ are idenrified, the normalisaàon UA ~ is necessary for
idenàficaàon.
The covariance matrix E can be a full matrix. There seems to be no economic reasons
for setàng E(1,2) equal to uro. In particular, if we imposed F(1,2)-0 and then rewrite the
model with a different normalisaàon such as U;, ~, we would obtain a transformed
covariance matrix with a non-uro element in place of E(1,2) (the covariance between -u;, and
u,~ -u„ is nonuro if the covariance between u„ and u;~ is uro).
If we ignore labour market constraints leading to involuntary unemployment, U;, can be
interpreted as the difference between utility of employment and uàlity of non-pamcipation.
The term y,W; thus reflects the impact on uàlity ofthe difference between earnings andretutns
of non-paràcipaàon (i.e. home production). It might also pick up some taste shifter effect,
however. Since the wife's contribuàon to farm output is not observed, retums to acàvity as a
relative assisting are not measured. The tetm yZW; may to some extent pick up the part of-9-
difference between farm earnings and returns of home production not captured by other
regressors such as farm size and type. Again it may alsoreflect a pure taste shifter effect. Given
the information in the data, the two cannot be disentangled.
Setting F.(1,3)-E(2,3)-0 boils down to assuming that W is exogenous. Unobserved
characteristics not included in X or Z may however lead to correlation between v; and the u;;
's. Therefore, we shall at least try to estimate the model with a full covariance matrix E,
although, for practical purposes, it may still be necessary to impose zero restrictions.
The vectors of exogenous variables X and Z may partly overlap. Throughout the paper,
we shall assume that X contains at least one variable which is not in Z(e.g. characteristics of
the farm or family composition) and that Z contains at least one variable which is not in X(e.g.
the woman's education level). These two conditions are sufficient for (non-parametric)
identification of the model, even if no restrictions on E are imposed. It is clear that the latter
of the two, which is the hardest to defend frnm an economic point ofview, cannot be omitted,
unless restrictions on E are imposed instead.
Alternative Mnrtels
A number of variants and generalisations of the basic model described above are
possible. In order to determine the sensitivity of the results with respect to distributional and
functional fotm assumptions, it seems wonhwile to estimate some of these alternatives. The
relatively small number of observations makes a more general treatment, semi- or
semi-non-parametric estimation, infeasible.
The alternatives which we shall consider are the following:
(A) Multinomiu! Logit, exogenutes wuge rute.~~
Replace (5) by:
uy-EV, (j -0, 1, 2); v,-N(0,~), u,~,u;;, u;t, v; independent (5')-10-
Here EV denotes the (standard) extreme value distribution underlying the multinomial







(B) Multinomia! Logit, endogenous wage rates
The specification given above dces not allow for endogeneity of W. It can however
easily be generalised such that it dces, without essentially complicating the estimation
procedure. This is achieved by replacing (5') by
v;-N(0, ~) (7)
uy-4t;v,lv;-EV, Í-0,1,2, ~-0 (g)
uAI v;, u;,l v;, ual v; independent (9)
If lt; ~ 0, u;~ and v; are not independent. lt, and pz are parameters to be estimated. The
expression for the conditional choice probabilities which generalises (6) becomes
exp(A~ f lt~v) (6')
P(O-JIX.Z.W)-~exp(Akt~v) with v-W-Z'a
k
This thus boils down to adding the residual of the wage equarion to the systematic part of the
Uy's, with ccefficients ~t;.
(C) Non-linearities
The impact of exogenous variables and W on U;; may be non-linear. Obviously, if this
only concems observed exogenous variables, it is straightforwan3 to allow for, including
nonlinear transformations of these variables in X. The situation is slightly more complicated
if the impact of W is non-linear. We may, for example, want to use a Box-Cox transformation




For J~ --a 0, we again get the model with the log wage W. For ~. - 1 the wage itself is included.
In general, any ~, e Sïi is possible, although many people often assume that ~, e[0,1]. This
generalisation can be incorporated in the basic multinomial probit model, as well as in the
multinomial logit variants. As will be seen below, the non-linearities make ML-estimation
more difficult, hut does not complicate a simulation-based estimation procedure.
3.2 Estimation procedures
The basic model can be estimated in several ways. Apart from ML- estimation, we
discuss some alternative estimators, which can also be used to estimate the altetnative models.
ML-estimation ofthe basic model
This is suaightforward. The likelihood contributions can be written as follows,
distinguishing the case that W is observed (D-1) and the case that W is not observed (D-2 or
D~). The index i is suppressed.
D-1, observed log wage W:
(10)
L -f (v)P(-u, ~ -A„u2 - u~ ~ A~ - AZI ti' ),
where v- W-Z'aand A~ - X,'p fyW
Here fdenotes the marginal density of v, which is univariate normalN(0, ~). The conditional
probability in (10) is biv.u'iate normal and therefore easy to compute, because of the
simultaneous normality of (u, ,u2 ,v).
D-2, wage rate not observed:
L-PIuz}Yzv~-X~pz-YzZ~a,uz-u~t(Yz-Y,)v~X'(Q,-~t(Y~-Yz)Z~aÏ (11)-12-
Again, this is a bivariate normal pmbability which can easily be computed. For D~, an
analagous expression can be given.
ML-estimation of the full model, not imposing restrictions on E, yields estimates of all
the parameters, including those in E. Ifrestricáons on E are imposed, the estimates of a,R and
y will only be consistent under the null that the restrictions are true. Thus, accounáng for
simultaneity implies the need to esámate more parameters. In this type of models, this can
someámes be avoided using a two step estimaáon procedure:
Two-step estimation ofthe basic modei
Step 1: Esámate a, using the familiar Heckman procedure (add a reduced form participation
equation to the wage equation to comect for selectivity bias). This yields an estimate a of a. In
principle, the esàmate of a will not be consistent given the complete model: According to the
complete model, paràcipaàon is determined by two separate equaáons, and this is
approximated by one reduced fotm participaáon equaáon. However, in practice the asymptotic
bias will be yuite small.
Step 2: Replacc W; in (3) by its precíiction 'L;'a and estimate the resulting multinomial probit
model. This solves the problem that W; is someámes unobserved. Moreover, although W; may
be cornelated with u9, its predicted systematic part Z;'a will in general be (asymptoácally)
unconelated with uy. Thus, the estimator remains consistent if there is simultaneity.
Although this may seem a feasible and computationally attractive procedure, it also
creates a new problem: Note that subsàtuáng (3) and (4) into (10) yields
U~ - X;'~~ t r~;'at uyt Y;v,(Í - 0.1, 2) (12)
D; -j if and only if Uy ~ U;~, k- 0,1,2 (13)
The second step implies replacing Z;'a by Z;'a and estimaàng (12) and (13) as a
mulánomial probit model. This implies a normalisaáon different from the original one
(F.(I,l)-E(2,2)-1): If V{u;~j-1, then, in general, V(u~ty~v;} ~I. The esámates of (3 thus have-13-
to be rescaled. This is easy if it is assumed that Cov{v;,u;t)-~. Otherwise, however, it requires
estimaàng these covariances. For similar reasons, the esàmated covariance between the two
etTOrs in the two equations of (12) is not the same as Cov(u;,,uuJ.
The two-step procedure thus suffers from sever.tl drawbacks. The assumptions needed
for consistency are just as strong as for ML (We need normality and homoskeda.eticity of v; to
obtain normality and homoskedasticity of the errors in (12)). Obtaining consistent estimaoes of
the standard en-ors, taking into account that a is replaced by a, requines extra computations.
Simulared Maximum Likelihond
Exact ML-esàmation of the basic model is straightforward because the probabiliàes in
(10) and (11) are bivariate normal. In the alternaàve models, (11) contains either a convoluàon
of a normal and an extreme value distribuàon (the mulànomial logit case), or a non-linear
function of two normals (in case of non-linearity). In both cases, ii remains easy to compute
the probabiliry in (10), since the second factor treats v as known. Problems arise with (11).
Note that (11) can be replaced by
L- f j(v )P Ith ~-X'liz - Ys(Z'af v), uz - u, ~ X'(Rr -(iz) }(Yr -Y2) (Z'a t v) ~ v[dv
-E{P[D -2~vj} (11')
where the expectation is taken with respect to v. In all variants of the model, P[D - 2~ vj is
easy to compute, but the expectation is not, except for the basic model. One way to





For large R, La approximates L, because of the law of large numbers. Instead of maximising
the exact likelihood, the approximate likelihood can be maximised, in which for the-14-
observaàons with D-2, L is replaced by La (and similarly for those with D-0). The resulàng
estimatoris known as Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML). See Lerman and Manski (1981)
or Gourieroux and Monfort (1990). For fixed R, the esàmator is inconsistent. lf R tends to
infinity with the numlx~r of obse.rvations, thc cstimator is consistent. Mon;ovcr, provided Ihut
draws for different indivdiuals are independent, ML and SML will be asymptotically
equivalent as Rl~ ~~, where N is the number of observaàons (cf. Gourieroux and Monfort,
1990).
Using Complemenrary Data
A problem with the estimaàon procedures described above is the lack of data on wage
rates. In the data set to be used, containing fatmer's wives only, no more than 44 women have
a fotmal job. Instead of estimaàng a and ts„ from these 44 observaàons only, it is possible to
use the full data set of married women to estimate a wage equaàon. The implicit assumption,
that the wages of farmer's wives are determined in the same way as wages of other married
women, seems a reasonable one. Esàmates fora and a~ based on the whole data set are given
in Callan (1991). The sample used there contains 1712 married women, 324 of whom are
employed with observed wage rate. We use results corrected for selectivity bias (Column 3 of
Table 1, Callan, 1991). Thus, instead of estimaàng all the parameters simultaneously, an
alternaàve approach is to assume that a and ts,. are equal to the Callan (1991) estimates and
estimate the other parameters. In principle, the standard errors have to be corrected for the fact
that a and a, are replaced by the'v estimates. We present the uncorrected standard error
esàmates, which thus may be biased downwards. This problem dces not seem to be too serious,
because of the relatively large number of observations used to estimate a and v,. Estimation
results based on a wage equaàon which includes only the farmers' wives in the present sample,
reported below, provide a check on this procedure. The altetnaàve wage equation estimates
are available on request.-15-
Some idea of the reliabiliry of this procedure can also be gained by testing the structural
stability of the wage equation over the full sample as against two sub-samples: the 44 farnt
wives and 2R2 non-farm wives. As expected, least squares estimates show that structural
stability of the wage equation as between the full sample and sub-samples of farm and
non-fatm wives is not rejected.
4.Results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Maximum likelihood estimates of the basic model are set out in Table 3. The table
contains three sets of estimates. In the first two, the parameters a and a, in the wage equation
are not esrimated, but set equal to the estimates based on a larger data set (cf. Callan, 1991,
Table 1, column 3). The first set is based on the assumption that E is a diagonal matrix, and
thus imposes exogeneity of W. The second set ofestimates shows the consequences ofrelaxing
the conditions on E.
The estimates of the correlation coefficients are very imprecise. An upper-bound on
p(1,2) had to be imposed to ensure that E is positive definite. Thus no standatd etmr for the
estimate ofp(1, 2) could be computed. The standatà enrors for the other cortelation ccefficients
are huge and suggest that, from a practical point of view, there is no point in estimating E with
the data at hand, even though the model is identified in theory. However, a likelihood ratio
test based on the restricted and unrestricted likelihoods clearly rejects diagonality of E.-16-
Table 3: ML-estimates ofthe Basic Model
~ II II!
parameter std error parameter std error parameter std error
Correlations
rho(u„u~ 0.8418' -- 0.8651 ~ --
rho(u„v) -0.1400 0.5160 -0.4148 0.9189
rho(uZ,v) 0.2154 0.5960 -0.3813 1.1444
Employment vs. Non-participation
constant -1.5520 28.5576 -5.1307 21.5148 -8.2709 20.0414
log age 2.8984 15.8265 3.8290 11.8012 5.3926 10.9743
log 2 age -0.7368 2.1759 -0.6944 1.5992 -0.8456 1.4855
young 0-4 -0.4424 0.3857 -0.2324 0.2715 -0.1850 0.2394
log fam siz -0.1965 0.3343 0.0421 0.2400 0.2113 0.2405
reg unemprt -3.6089 5.3385 -5.4829 3.4848 -7.3556 2.8957
log inc hus -0.0494 0.0676 -0.0060 0.0466 0.0231 0.0411
log farm siz -0.1707 0.1561 -0.0299 0.1130 0.0974 0.1169
dum cattle 0.2980 0.2688 0.2981 0.1803 0.1775 0.1617
dum soill 0.1969 0.2636 0.2816 0.1822 0.2793 0.1569
dum soii3 -0.0938 0.5170 0.1374 0.3051 0.3664 0.2840
dum debt os -0.5881 1.4633 -1.2659 1.0453 -1.5612 0.9062
log debt os 0.1229 0.1633 0.1862 0.1181 0.2133 0.1009
log wage rt 1.0072 0.2651 0.7561 0.2831 0.2471 0.1367
Relative Assisting vs. Non-participation
constant -38.4688 25.4719 -19.5815 20.5113 -]0.7054 22.7206
log age 20.9443 13.7976 I 1.4184 11.1279 6.6039 12.3199
log 2 age -2.8089 1.8460 -1.6224 1.4900 -0.9926 1.6439
young 0-4 0.0123 0.2597 -0.1665 0.2367 -0.1846 0.2379
log fam siz 0.4252 0.2486 0.3016 0.2227 0.2543 0.2166
reg unemprt -9.3229 3.2719 -8.0377 2.7582 -7.4016 2.6798
log inc hus 0.0708 0.0417 0.0452 0.03R I 0.0307 0.0398
log farmsiz 0.2227 ll.l 175 0.1435 0.11108 0.1222 0.1056
dum cattle 0.1368 Q 1536 0.1667 0.1392 0.1557 0.1396
dum soil 1 0.3217 0.1704 0.3Oy4 0.1499 0.2832 0.1586
dum soil 3 0.4928 0.2210 0.4452 0.2140 0.4184 U.2136
dum debt os -1.7462 0.7641 -1.7663 0.7138 -1.6596 0.8286
log debt os 0.2217 0.0865 0.2316 0.0809 0.2227 0.0940
log wage rt -0.7501 0.4190 -0.2078 0.3192 0.1331 0.4373
log likelihood -307.57 -297.83 -290.21
Notes: [: E diagonal, wage equation estimates from Callan (1991)
Il: E ftee, wage equation estimates from Callan (1991)
III: E fiee, wage equation estimated simultaneously
~` upper bound imposed because E must be positive definite-17-
In the third column the wage equation esàmates fmm Callan ( 1991) are not used.
Instead, observed wage rates in the sample of farm wives (for the 44 women with a formaljob)
are used to estimate the wage equation simultaneously with the rost of the modeL According
to a likelihood ratio test, relaxing the restrictions that a and a, are equal to the Callan (1991)
values dces not yield significant improvement. Moreover, scandard errors in column 3 are
close enough to those in column 2 to suggest that the problem of underestimaàng standard
errors in the "complementary data" procedure is not a serious one. Thus, from this point on,
we confine our attention to estimates which use the wage equation from Callan (1991).
The sets of esàmates for the parameters p,, y„ ~ and y2 are not too different. In the
equation determining the choice between non-participaàon and employment, only the log
wage rate is significant (at the 59'0 level), with the expected posiàve sign. In the equaàon
determining the choice between non-participaàon and relative assisàng, some significance
levels tend to vazy. Significance levels for the first estimator, which imposes most constraints,
are not systemaàcally lazger than for the second estimator. The general conclusions are
comparable. The main difference concerns the estimated impact of the wage rate. In both cases
the effect is negative, but its magnitude und significunce level v.uy.
Since the likelihood ratio test suggests that some of the error correlaàons are non-zero,
we concentrate in discussing the equation dealing with relatives assisàng as against
non-participation, on the second panel. Two variables dealing with farm debt are significant:
a negative ccefficient on a dummy for whether or not there is any debt, offset by a posiàve
ccefficient on the log of the amount outstanding. Since the amounts of debt outstanding are
in pracàce quite large, the net effect is that debt has a posiàve and increasing effect on
panicipation as a relative assisting. While there is a potential endogeneity in this area, debt
overhang can also be the result of exogenous shocks such as those which pushed farm incomes
to low levels in the mid-1980s. It seems from these estimates that one response to such debt
overhang could have been to increase labour input by becoming a relaàve assisàng.-18-
Fatm wives are also more likely to participate as relaáves assisáng on larger farms,
though this is significant only at the (one-sided) 10 per cent level. Standard producáon
funcáon consideraáons would lead to such an effect: one would expect the marginal product
of labour to rise with farm size. The other staásácally significant ccefficients are somewhat
more difficult to interpret: there is a positive ccefficient on both soil type 1(the most fertile
soils) and soil type 3(the least fertile), as well as on the regional unemployment rate. The
ccefficient on the regional unemployment rate is heavily influenced by observaáons for one
region: DonegaUNorth-West. A dummy for this region (or its exclusion) seems, from some
additional analysis, to lead to the expected negaáve effect of the regional unemployment rate
on faim wive's participaáon in the paid labour market, with the influence on participation
assisting becoming insignificanáy different fmm zero.
In Table 4, we present the results of a two step estimaáon procedure, again based on the
wage equaáon estimates for the full sample set out in Callan (1991). The selecáon equaáons
are estimated as a mulánomial probit model, and, as discussed above, the esámates should be
rescaled to compare them with those in Table 3. Without actualiy carrying out the rescaling
proceduie in too much detaii (and without cotrecáng standard errors), some conclusions can
srill be drawn. Again, all parameters in the employment versus non-participaáon equaáon are
insignificant, except for the log wage rate. The sign of y, is again positive, but the magnitude
of the effect according is somewhat out of line with the other estimates. This cannot be
explained by rescaling. The estimates in the middle panel of Table 3 imply that
V(u, f y,v } a 1.08, so the estimate ofy, should be rescaled from 1.88 to 1.95. However, the
rescaling factor depends on the very inaccurate esámate of Cov{ u„v].
For the relaáve assisáng versus non-participaáon parameters, the parameter
corresponding to the log of the wage becomes significantly negative. This suggests that
women who are able to command a high wage either tend to participate in paid employment,-19-
or else to work in the home, but not to participate as relatives assisting. Otherwise, parameter
estimates and significance levels largely correspond to those in Table 3. Rescaling hardly plays
a role here, because of the small absolute value of y2 in the second panel of Table 3.
Table 4: Two-step E.rtimates ofBasic Mode!
F.mployment vs Nnn-particpation Relative a.ssisting vs
Non-participation
parameter ,std error paratneter std error
constant 6.5562 28.2595 37.2201 23.7837
log age -2.9400 15.7309 20.7167 12.8653
log 2 age 0.1368 2.1651 -2.8113 1.7206
young 0-4 -0.3859 0.3937 -0.0302 0.2485
log fam siz -0.1293 0.3430 0.3928 0.2334
reg unemprt 0.1259 5.2837 -9.7230 2.9241
log inc hus -0.0754 0.0733 0.0698 0.0392
log farmsiz -0.2295 0.1604 0.2195 0.1080
dum cattle 0.2759 0.2555 0.1437 0.1461
dum soil 1 0.1255 0.2585 0.3304 0.1603
dum soil 3 -0.1182 0.5629 0.4814 0.2093
dum debt os -0.5709 1.3458 -1.7445 0.697R
log debt os 0.1122 0.1530 0.2238 0.0787
log wage rt 1.8895 0.3347 -0.9191 0.3692
log likelihood -303.03
Notes: Predicted wages for all, using wage equation estimates from Callan (1991).
ln Table 5, we present the simulated maximum likelihood estimates of the basic model,
for various choices of R, i.e. the number of draws of v per observation. Diagonali[y of E has
been imposed, and the wage equation estimates of Callan (1991) have been implemented. Thus
the estimates in Table 5 should approximate those in the left panel of Table 3, and the only
reason for including Table 5 is to see how good the approximation is for different values of R.
Appazently, differences in estimates as well as standard errors are not very large. Standard
etTOrs tend to be somewhat underestimated. Somewhat surprisingly, the difference between the-Za
nsults for R-S anJ those for R-i(1 are srnaller th;m the dil7erences hetwecn the exact MI,
results and those with R-50. R-50 thus seems toyield reasonable results. Therefore, R-50 will
also be used in the alternative models, in which comparison with exact ML is computadonally
intractable.-2l -
Table 5: Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Basic Model
SML SML, SML,
nrr-5 ntr-10 ntr-50
purumeter std error parumeter std error parumeter std error
Employment vs. Non-participutiun
constant 2.3651 28.1003 -0.2810 28.9417 -2.1830 28.6542
log age 0.7941 15.5490 2.2396 16.0209 3.2118 15.8843
log 2 age -0.4374 2.1332 -0.6522 2.2017 -0.7800 2.1850
young 0-4 -0.3846 0.37R5 -0.4302 0.3911 -0.4440 0.3875
log fam siz -0.1832 03189 -0.2123 0.33R9 -0.2015 0.3376
reg unemprt -4.5844 5.2224 -3.3139 5.4064 -3.5223 5.3634
log inc hus -0.0453 0.0658 -0.0585 0.0679 -0.0505 0.0681
log fatmsiz -0.1697 0.1473 -0.2018 0.1593 -0.1692 0.1569
dum cattle 0.2643 0.2583 0.3077 0.2723 0.3104 0.2712
dum soil 1 0.2187 (1.2551 0.1777 0.2660 0.1998 0.2650
dum soil 3 -0.1278 0.4889 -0.1331 0.5279 -0.1061 0.5197
dum debt os -0.7002 139R6 -0.6600 t.4404 -0.6012 1.4574
log dcbt os 0.1345 0.1563 0.1330 0.1 GO8 0.1235 0.1625
log wage rt 0.916(i 0.2357 I.ORR I 0.2679 I.(k198 0.2676
Relative Assisting vs. Non-participation
constant -38.1548 24.5328 -35.2080 24.7033 -35.1564 24.8541
log age 20.6674 13.2163 18.9576 13.3396 19.0147 13.4452
log 2 age -2.7712 1.7640 -2.5326 1.7820 -2.5439 1.7975
young 0-4 -0.0037 0.2579 -0.0146 0.2512 0.O052 0.2547
log fam siz 0.4119 0.2412 0.4145 0.2411 0.4099 0.2419
reg unemprt -8.7292 2.9313 -R.S765 3.0505 -8.5976 3.1010
log inc hus 0.0703 0.0402 0.0710 0.0407 0.0651 0.0403
log fatmsiz 0.2239 0.1109 0.2104 0.1158 0.2016 0.1126
dum cattle 0.1519 0.1507 0.1479 0.1484 0.1407 0.1498
dum soil 1 0.30R4 0.162R 0.3233 0.1654 0.3033 O.Ifi47
dum soil 3 0.5O41 0.2164 0.5024 0? l72 0.4~)I G 0.21(Ki
dum debt os -1.6362 0.7674 -1.7089 0.7573 -1.7279 0.7490
log debt os 0.2081 O.OR67 0.2 ]49 O.OR56 0.21 R9 O.OR49
log wage rt -0.(r134 (1.2608 -0.53G9 0.3357 -0.5906 0.3R2R
N2
log likelihctoci -3(1R.19 -308.10 -308.06-22-
Simulated maximum likelihood estimates for the multinomial logit version of the model
are given in Table 6. In each case, we use the estimates of the wage equation from Callan
(1991). The left two panels impose independence of the three error terms in the selection part
of the model from the ertvr in the wage equation. The estimates are based upon 10 and 50
draws per observation, and the differences between the two sets are quite small. In the last set,
cortelation betwcen (tto,u„u2) and v is allowed for. A likelihood ratio test rejects the null
lt, - N, - 0, implying that W is endogenous. However, the estimates of the lt, seem rather
inaccurate, and the separate hypotheses ~t, - 0(j-1,2) cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level.
This finding corresponds to what was found in the multinominal pmbit model.
Qualitative conclusions from the estimates of the selection equations remain largely the
same as those fmm the basic model. Chcxising between employmcnt and non-pani~ipation ix
only significantly affected by the wage. The wage rate coefficients are of similar magnitudc as
those in Tables 1 and 3 if appropriately rescaled (which now means dividing by
[n213 t ~t;~]"~.-23-
Table 6: Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation ofMultinomial Logit Model
SMI. .SMI., ,SMl.,
~ur-10 ntr-S(1 ratr-50
exoKeru~w wages exogeruius wages endogeru~us wages
parameter std error parameter std error parameter std error
Employment vs. Non-participatèon
constant 3.7448 50.6004 -0.5685 49.9703 6.6639 52.1133
log age 1.7882 28.1493 4.0720 27.8377 -1.2672 29.1924
log 2 age -0.8641 3.8731 -1.1712 3.8343 -0.3928 4.0337
young 0-4 -0.7685 0.6959 -0.8145 0.6913 -0.7978 0.7108
log fam siz -0.2215 0.6204 -0.2117 0.6187 -0.1975 0.6648
reg unemprt -8.3896 9.7371 -8.8252 9.6884 -3.9095 9.9763
log inc hus -0.1162 0.1253 -U.0990 0.1254 -0.1198 0.1459
log fatmsiz -0.2863 0.2914 -0.2279 0.2866 -0.4348 0.3102
dum cattle 0.5348 0.5013 0.5253 0.4981 0.6645 0.5253
dum soil 1 0.3675 0.4916 0.4060 0.4880 0.3964 0.5351
dum soil 3 -0.0643 0.8786 -0.0468 0.8622 -0.2569 0.9605
dum debt os -1.7547 2.5966 -1.5793 2.6457 -2.0795 2.8486
log debt os 0.3088 0.2908 0.2840 0.2958 0.3240 0.3245
log wage rt 1.9215 0.5368 1.8632 0.5417 3.3383 0.7052
~t, -1.5347 1.1901
Relative Assisting vs. Non-participation
constant -56.0396 41.20R4 -55.2370 41.3292 -5R.5993 42.6530
log age 30.6534 22.2259 30.2962 22.3206 33.3290 23.1006
log 2 age -4.1476 2.9651 -4.1033 2.9791 -4.6065 3.0917
young 0-4 -0.0768 0.4231 -0.0617 0.4270 -0.2057 0.4480
log fam siz 0.6083 0.3967 0.6000 0.3968 0.5762 0.4174
reg unemprt -14.8192 5.1046 -14.7112 5.1550 -17.2112 5.7360
log inc hus 0.1097 0.0678 0.10]3 0.0668 0.1 ]74 0.0718
log farmsiz 0.3387 0.1913 0.3251 0.1853 0.3495 0.1977
dum cattle 0.2697 0.2471 0.2586 0.2481 0.3152 0.2677
dum soil 1 0.5546 0.2745 0.5249 0.2718 0.6241 0.3030
dum soil 3 0.8463 0.3630 0.8253 0.3615 0.8367 0.3874
dum debt os -3.1596 1.2712 -3.1749 1.2654 -3.5091 1.3883
log debt os 0.4017 0.1448 0.4056 0.1445 0.4491 0.1595
log wage rt -0.7088 0.5647 -0.7361 0.6323 -1.1872 0.6708
~ 2.5565 1.8212
log likelihood -307.72 -306.64 -299.50-24
Finally, some non-lineaz models are estimated, using (3') instead of (3). Some of the
insignificant regtessors have been removed. For comparison, estimates for the basic linear
model with the reduced set of regressors is also given.
The estimates for the Box-Cox parameter appears to be quite large (larger than 1), but
also may be very imprecise. In the basic version of the model, the t-value of ~. suggests that it
is not significantly different from 0 at any reasonable level. On the other hand, a likelihood
ratio test, based on comparing the likelihood values of the first two panels in Table 7, suggests
that the Box-Cox transformation dces yield significant improvement. In the multinomial logit
case, in which we have also allowed for cornelation between v and the u~'s, the estimate differs
significantly from 0 at the 10 per cent level, but the standard error is quite lazge. Moreover, the
presence of the Box-Cox transformation makes estimating y, and y2 much hazder. The
standard errors increase and significance levels drop strongly. Estimates of the correlation
structure (i.e., lt, and ~ are substantially affected. However, the parameter estimates for the
other regressors in the selection equation are not much changed.-25-
Table 7: Simulated Maximum Likelihood (R-25) Estimation of Linear and Non-Linear
MndeLs
Probit Probit MNL
E diaxnna! EdiaRnnal Efree
purameter std error parameter std error parameter .rtd error
Employment vs. Non-participation
constant 7.0599 2.1930 8.2346 2.2557 13.3875 5.0081
log age -2.0777 0.4846 -2.2392 0.5149 -4.0000 1.1003
log fam siz -0.3144 0.2879 -0.2449 0.2831 -0.2565 0.6241
reg unempn -4.8511 4.6312 -3.5653 4.7360 -5.2794 10.0095
log inc hus -0.0401 OA674 -0.0546 0.0754 -0.0928 0.1895
log fatmsiz -0.1572 0.1505 -0.0960 0.1500 -0.2990 0.3305
dum cattle 1.0798 0.5465
dum soil l 0.6218 0.6101
dum soil 3 -0.2463 1.1627
dum dcbt os -0.5889 1.2734 -0.3406 1.3828 -2.5753 3.6584
log debt os 0.1299 0.1436 0.0982 0.1579 0.4092 0.4203
log wage rt 1.0197 0.2257 0.0013 0.0060 0.3851 0.5123
~t, 0.6885 1.2741
Relative Assisting vs. Non-participation
cunstant -0.8589 I.9324 - I.2786 1.8461 1.9188 5.1076
log age 0.201U 0.4054 0.2321 0.4034 -0.7436 1.0961
log fam siz 0.5574 0.1901 0.5316 0. ]881 1.1374 0.5167
reg unemprt -7.5412 2.8189 -7.3607 2.7497 -21.3859 8.8599
log inc hus 0.0828 0.0386 0.0846 0.0396 0.2001 0.1123
log fatmsiz 0.1819 0.1068 0.1854 0.1072 0.5172 0.3105
dum cattle 0.3856 0.3976
dum soil 1 0.8342 0.4498
dum soil 3 1.4064 0.6841
dum debt os -1.5083 0.7288 -1.5796 0.7475 -5.0084 1.9879
log debt os 0.1911 0.0826 0.2020 0.0852 0.6574 0.2396
log wage rt -0.3467 0.3032 -0.0014 0.0056 -0.0932 0.2216
~ 5.1312 I.R794
Box-Cox parameter 3.6759 2.3650 1.2906 0.7545
log likelihood: -316.13 -308.89 -295.38-26-
4.2 Evaluation of results
In order to get some insight in the implications of the parameter estimates for the wage
rate sensitivity of the choice bc,tween non-panicipation, forrnal employment, and relative
assisting, we computed the estimated probabiliáes of the three states as a function of the wage
rate, for someone whose other (own, husband's, household's and fatm characterisács) are
equal to the average in the sample. The results for eight sets of pazameter esámates are
presented in Figttre 1.
In general, the probability of fonnal employment increases with the wage, whereas the
probabiliry of relaáve assisting decreases with the wage. This corresponds to the estimated
wage parameter in the employment equaáon. Note that a posiáve wage rate ccefficient in the
employment vs non- parácipation equaáon also implies a negaáve effect of potenáal wages
on the probabiliry of relaáve assisáng. This effect may dominate the (often small and
insignificant) wage effect through the relaáve assisáng vs non- participation equaáon.
Although the direcáon of the effect is the same in all models, its magnitude varies a lot.
For the basic model with diagonal covariance matrix, simulated ML and MI. yield very similaz
results. This appears to be the case even for smaller values of R than the one (R-50) depicted.
The two step estimates however suggest a much larger sensiávity. The graph for the SML
estimates of the multinomial logit model with exogenous wage rates is again quite similar to
the ML or SMI. basic model results.
The model extensions which allow for wage rate endogeneity or non- linearity through
a Box-Cox transfotmaáon, yield quite different patterns, suggesting a larger wage rate
sensiávity estimates. In calculaáng the probabiliáes for these simultaneous models, the
cortelation between the errors has been ignored. This may explain part of the differences.Figurc t : Srnxiriviry ojproóahiliry ojpurri~ iE~~triun rn wuge rurr
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In Figure 2, similar graphs are drawn as a function of age, for a fixed value of the wage
rate (f:2.95 per hour). The probability of formal employment decreases with age, whereas the
probability of relative assisting is increasing at most ages, and, according to most of the results,
decreasing at higher ages. The differences between the various graphs tend to be somewhat
smaller than in Figure 1. In particular, the ML and SML results for the basic model are again
quite similaz.
Figures l and 2 are based on point estimates of the relevant pazameters, and do not reveal
the uncenainty due to the fact that pazameters are replaced by their estimates. Therefore, we
have also computed some asymptotic confidence intervals for wage rate elasticities. These
elasticities aze intricate nonlinear functions of the estimated pazameters. Therefore, instead of
using the delta method, we have used simulations to obtain the confidence intervals, as in Van
Scest (1992). This boils down to drawing from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the
pazameter estimator, and look at the distribution of resulting elasticities. This method avoids
the need to take derivatives and works well as long as the elasticities are differentiable
functions of the parameters.-30-
Table 8: Wage Rate Elasticities
Wage rate- IrfS
Median Mean
































Wage rate - Irf10
Decile cut-oJj`s Decile cut-offs
lOth 90th Median Mean lOth 90th
-0.437 0.668 -0.924 -1.067 -2.288 -0.171
2.051 3.813 2.437 2.513 ].830 3.387
-2.744 -0.556 -4.035 -4.091 -6.875 -1.382
-1.595 0.443 -1.531 -1.700 -3.588 0.080
0.801 1.589 1.178 1.163 0.830 1.543
-1.216 -0.339 -1.542 -1.643 -2.570 -0.881
-1.777 0.530 -4.537 -5.169 -8.840 -1.545
2.755 6.156 2.072 2.304 1.058 3.700
-4.145 -0.957 -7.653 -8.096 -13.404 -3.338
-0.611 0.672 -0.957 -1.183 -2.763 -0.023
1.964 4.114 2.554 2.632 1.593 3.717
-2.552 -0.502 -3.050 -3.337 -6.351 -1.136
-0.812 0.666 -1.092 -1.374 -3.236 0.095
2.029 4.054 2.909 2.833 1.408 4.229
-2.453 -0.352 -3.247 -3.314 -5.473 -1.321
-1.540 0.512 -5.229 -5.473 -8.774 -2.775
3.494 6.177 1.999 2.171 1.041 3.650
-3.627 -1.328 -8.(135 -8.363 -11.611 -5.142
0.003 0.802 0.003 -2.804 -12.717 0.593
0.025 1.950 4.642 -3.069 0.026 9.682
-1.170 -0.004 -2.670 -93.736 -96.675 -0.007
-4.303 0.498 -13.858 -20.249 -56.512 -1.257
-3.433 6.258 2.4b0 -2.169 -28.467 6.107
-2.843 1.066 -12.783 -14.181 -30.490 0.059
Notes: NP: non-participation, E: fotmal employment, RA: relative assisting.-31-
The results in Table 8 aze all based on 100 draws. Of the ]00 resulting elasáciáes, we
present the median, the mean, and the fint and ninth decile. In some cases, the drawn parameter
values are such that the probability of a certain state becomes very small. In that case the
(absolute) value of the elasticity can be extremely large. To reduce the impact of this type of
outliers, it seems better to look at the median than at the mean. The latter two can be interpreted
as an approximate 80~Io two-sided confidence interval. We computed elasticiáes at two levels
of the wage rate, IrFS and IrE 10. Our calculaáons are based on the same sets of estimates as
those used in Figure l.
Pazameter esámates for the non-linear models seem to be quite inaccurate, and
elasáciáes vary wildly. One of the reasons is that estimates of state probabilities are someámes
quite small. The number of observations is probably too smatl to let the asymptoács work well.
Using bootstrapping might be an alternative.
For the other models, results seem more reliable. Again, SML and ML based results for
the basic model are yuite similar, and similar to the basic multinomial logit results with
exogenous wage rates. The wage rate elasticity of fotmal employment is significanáy posiáve
(at the one sided ]09~0 level), and may take on values between 1.5 and 4. The wage rate
elasticity of relative assisting is significantly negative, but the confidence intervals aze quite
lazge. The sign of the wage elasticity of non-participaáng is not unambiguously determined.
5. Conclusions
While Census and Labour Force Survey data suggest that the numbers of relaáves
assisting on family farms have declined to very low levels, more detailed sectoral
inveságaáons suggest otherwise. Evidence from the ESRI survey confitms that the status of
relative assisting on family fatTns is indeed a numerically important one. Particulaz attention
may need to be given to this area in thc annual Lubour Force Survey.-32-
Econometric analysis of farm wives' labour supply found certain similarities to that of
other married women. The wage determination ptncess seemed to be similar; and those who
could command high wages were more likely to be found in employment. The factors
influencing the choice between non-participaàon and paràcipation as a relative assisting were
more difficult to identify: the small sample size dces not help. But physical characterisàcs
such as farm size and soil type seemed to have a role, together with economic consideraàons
such as the level of debt outstanding. As regards paràcipaàon in the paid labour market,
however, it is clear that the role of wages is central.-33-
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Appendix A: Variable descriptions
log AGE log of (woman's age at last birthday)
log 2 AGE square of log AGE
YOUNG 0-4 dummy: -1 when woman has a child aged less than 4
FAM SIZ family size - 2 t number of dependant children, as defïned by
conditions for receipt of child benefit
REG UNEMPRT regional unemployment rate
log INC HUS log of (husband's off-farm employment income (fJweek) tl)
Notc: Income fmm fanning is not included, because it is impossible
to separate the return to husbands and wives when both are working
on the farm.
FARMSIZ famt size in acres
dum CATTLE dummy: -1 when fatm system is cattle
dum SOIL 3 dummy: -1 when soil type - 3(least fertile)
dum SOIL 1 dummy: -1 when soil type - 1(most femle)
dum DEBT OS dummy: -1 when fatm debt outstanding is positive
log DEBT OS log of (amount of debt outstanding tl)
log WAGE RT log of (gtoss hourly wage rate)-35-
Appendix B: Sample characteristics
Non-participunts Employees Relatives assisting
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
AGE 48.7 9.8 39.6 9.8 46.7 9.3
YOUNG 0-4 0.20 0.40 0.34 0.48 0.25 0.43
FAM SIZ 1.57 l.6fi 2.07 1.R9 2.23 1.91
REG UE RT 16.6 2.81 15.7 2.69 15.8 2.44
INC HUS 22.95 59.58 22.63 81.98 39.8 98.17
FARMSIZ 61.3 46.1 71.9 51.6 65.3 44.2
dum SOIL 1 0.27 0.44 0.41 0.50 0.36 0.48
dum SOIL 3 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.29 0.18 0.39
dum DEBT OS 0.20 0.40 0.48 0.51 0.27 0.45
DEBT OS~ 8092 12299 t4068 13894 14392 18369
WAGE RT - - 6.66 4.24 - -
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